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THE COMMON LAW AND THE
ENVIRONMENT IN THE COURTS
Stuart Buckt
INTRODUCTION
Numerous scholars over the past decade or two have argued for a
renewed emphasis on common law solutions to environmental
problems.' In this paper, I will begin by describing the basic common
law institutions and principles that can be used to address
environmental problems. I will examine both the successes and
failures of common law actions in courts.2 As I argue below, the
overriding question whether the common law is superior to agency
regulation is indeterminate, both because there is no agreed-on
definition of what counts as "superior," and because there is little
solid empirical evidence as to the comparative efficacy of each type
of legal institution.
t Associate, Kellogg, Huber, Hansen, Todd, Evans & Figel, Washington, D.C.; J.D.,
Harvard Law School, 2000. Clerk to the Honorable David Nelson, United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit (2000-01) and the Honorable Stephen F. Williams, United States
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit (2001-02). The views expressed in this paper in no way
represent the views of my law firm or any of its clients.
I See, e.g., Karol Boudreaux & Bruce Yandle, Public Bads and Public Nuisance:
Common Law Remedies for Environmental Decline, 14 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 55 (2002)
"[P]ublic nuisance law can be robust in dealing with environmental harms .... ; MICHAEL S.
GREVE, THE DEMISE OF ENVIRONMENTALISM IN AMERICAN LAW 115 (1996) (arguing for a
return to the "logic and the basic premises of the common law"); Roger E. Meiners & Bruce
Yandle, Clean Water Legislation: Reauthorize or Repeal?, TAKING THE ENVIRONMENT
SERIOUSLY 73, 95 (Roger E. Meiners & Bruce Yandle, eds. 1993) (arguing that "the common
law would provide more environmental protection than has the regulatory process.").
2 This article addresses only common law civil actions. For a discussion of common law
crimes, see Steven L. Humphreys, An Enemy of the People: Prosecuting the Corporate Polluter
as a Common Law Criminal, 39 AM. U. L. REV. 311 (1990).
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I. BASIC COMMON LAW PRINCIPLES
A. Private and Public Nuisances
It has been said that "[t]here is no common law doctrine that
approaches nuisance in comprehensiveness or detail as a regulator of
land use and of technological abuse .... Nuisance theory and case
law is the common law backbone of modem environmental and
energy law.",
3
There are two broad categories of nuisances: private and public.4
A private nuisance is typically defined as "a nontrespassory invasion
of another's interest in the private use and enjoyment of land."5 The
elements include a showing of "conduct [that] is a legal cause of an
invasion of another's interest in the private use and enjoyment of
land, and the invasion is either (a) intentional and unreasonable, or (b)
unintentional and otherwise actionable under the rules controlling
liability for negligent or reckless conduct, or for abnormally
dangerous conditions or activities."6 A prototypical definition of
"nuisance" is given by the West Virginia Supreme Court:
When the prosecution of a business, of itself lawful, in a
strictly residential district, impairs the enjoyment of homes in
the neighborhood, and infringes upon the well-being,
comfort, repose, and enjoyment of the ordinary normal
individual residing therein, the carrying on of such business
in such locality becomes a nuisance, and may be enjoined.7
In this modem statutory age, of course, traditional common law
offenses are now sometimes defined by statute. In Nevada, for
example, a statute defines a "nuisance" as anything that is "injurious
to health ... or an obstruction to the free use of property, so as to
interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of life or property."8 In
3 WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 112-13 (2nd ed. 1994); see also
Tom Kuhnle, The Rebirth of Common Law Actions for Addressing Hazardous Waste
Contamination, 15 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 187, 197 (1996). ("In recent years, the courts have
expanded the remedies available in nuisance actions.").
I Sometimes common law claims are used in tandem with federal statutory claims, such
as CERCLA, but do not seem to have any independent force. See, e.g., NutraSweet Co. v. X-L
Engineering Co., 227 F.3d 776, (7th Cir. 2000) (affirming district court judgment under
CERCLA and common law for defendant's disposal of hazardous compounds).
5 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821 D (1979).
6 See id. § 822.
7 Martin v. Williams, 93 S.E.2d 835, 844 (W. Va. 1956); see DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW
OF TORTS § 231 (2000) (landowners owe a duty not to create "a serious interference with
[neighboring landowners'] use and enjoyment of land by pollution or the like.").
8 NEV. REV. STAT. § 40.140 (2000); see Culley v. County of Elko, 711 P.2d 864, 866
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perhaps the most far-reaching statutory promotion of the common
law, the Michigan Environment Protection Act authorizes the state
courts to develop a "common law of environmental quality," 9 and
even allows state courts "to specify a new or different pollution
control standard if the [state] agency's standard falls short of the
substantive requirements."
' 10
Whether defined by statute or by judicial decisions, private
nuisance actions are often used to address environmental harms that
interfere with someone else's health or property, including air and
water pollution. For example, in Village of Wilsonville v. SCA
Services, Inc.," the defendant's attempt to open a chemical waste
disposal site was preliminarily enjoined, where the plaintiff showed
that the toxic chemical waste could explode, migrate, or contaminate
the groundwater, even though these harms had not yet occurred. The
court noted that a "prospective nuisance is a fit candidate for
injunctive relief,"' 2 and that a "court does not have to wait for [the
harm] to happen before it can enjoin such a result."' 3 The court
clarified, however, that such a preliminary injunction was appropriate
only where "it is highly probable that [the defendant's plans] will lead
to a nuisance, although if the possibility is merely uncertain or
contingent [the plaintiff] may be left to his remedy after the nuisance
has occurred."' 14 Similarly, in Bahrle v. Exxon Corp.,'5 property
owners sued a gas station on nuisance grounds, claiming that spills
from the station's storage tanks had contaminated the local
groundwater. The state appellate court held, among other things, that
even if the property owners' own wells had not yet been
contaminated, "[n]egligently caused economic loss may be
(1985) ("An actionable nuisance is an intentional interference with the use and enjoyment of
land that is both substantial and unreasonable."); see also, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 561.01 (1998)
("Anything which is injurious to health, or indecent or offensive to the senses, or an obstruction
to the free use of property, so as to interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of life or property,
is a nuisance. An action may be brought by any person whose property is injuriously affected or
whose personal enjoyment is lessened by the nuisance, and by the judgment the nuisance may
be enjoined or abated, as well as damages recovered.").
9 Nemeth v. Abonmarche Dev., Inc., 576 N.W.2d 641,648 (Mich. 1998).
10 Her Majesty the Queen v. City of Detroit, 874 F.2d 332, 337 (6th Cir. 1989).
1 426 N.E.2d 824, 836 (I11. 1981).
12 Id. (emphasis omitted).
13 Id. at 837.
14 Id. at 836. See also Nickels v. Burnett, 798 N.E.2d 817 (Ill. App. 2003) (affirming, on
nuisance grounds, a preliminary injunction against defendants' plans to construct a hog
confinement facility, on theory that it would damage the neighbors' health and land value); cf
William Aldred's Case, (1611) 8 James 1, 77 Eng. Rep. 816 (K.B.) (considering claim that a pig
sty created undue odor on neighboring land).
15 652 A.2d 178 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995), aff'd 678 A.2d 178 (N.J. Sup. Ct.
1995).
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recoverable absent physical harm by an identifiable class of plaintiffs
whose damage is reasonable foreseeable [sic]." 16 Here, future
potential damage was reasonably foreseeable due to the New Jersey
state government's investigation of the contamination.17
Another, more recent example is Ellis v. Gallatin Steel Co.,18 in
which a few rural Kentucky residents sued the Gallatin Steel
Company and Harsco Corp., alleging that the defendants' steel
manufacturing operations caused dust to migrate onto their property. 19
This dust, they claimed, caused respiratory problems, headaches,
itchy throats, and infections.20 The federal district court awarded
injunctive relief (under the Clean Air Act and Kentucky nuisance
law) and compensatory and punitive damages (under nuisance law).
21
As for the nuisance claims, the Sixth Circuit agreed with the district
court's evidentiary finding that the dust "interfered with [plaintiffs]
use and enjoyment of the property," 22 as well as the court's holding
that punitive damages were appropriate under Kentucky law because
the defendants' repeated emissions were in "wanton or reckless
disregard for the lives, safety or property of others. 23 The Sixth
Circuit also affirmed the district court's prospective injunction as to
the state-law nuisance claims, noting that there was "ample evidence"
of the "threat of continuing violations. 24
A "public" nuisance, by contrast, is an "unreasonable interference
with a right common to the general public."25 Whether the
interference counts as "unreasonable" is typically decided based on
several factors, including whether the "conduct involves a significant
interference with the public health, the public safety, the public peace,
the public comfort or the public convenience," whether "the conduct
16 Id. at 194.
17 Id.
18 390 F.3d 461 (6th Cir. 2004).
19 Id. at 466.
20 Id. at 466-67.
21 Id. at 466.
22 Id. at 470.
23 Id. at 471.
24 Id. at 472. The Sixth Circuit also held that the injunctions were improper insofar as the
district court issued them under the Clean Air Act, id. at 475-77, but this holding did not seem
to have affected the state-law injunctions.
For a few more examples of the common law's effectiveness in particular cases, see
Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline Co., 254 F.3d 925 (10th Cir. 2001) (affirming arbitrator's award of
damages and injunctive relief against Amoco for a leaky oil pipeline that damaged a creek
running through plaintiff's property); Trident Investment Management, Inc. v. Amoco Oil
Company, 194 F.3d 772 (7th Cir. 1999) (affirming damages award based on the claim that the
leakage of Amoco's gasoline on plaintiff's property lowered the value of the property );
Donaldson v. Cent. Ill. Pub. Serv. Co., 767 N.E.2d 314 (111. 2002) (affirming $3.2 million
judgment in case alleging that defendant's contamination had contributed to plaintiffs' cancer).
25 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 821 B (1979).
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is proscribed by a statute, ordinance or administrative regulation," or
whether "the conduct is of a continuing nature or has produced a
permanent or long-lasting effect, and, as the actor knows or has
reason to know, has a significant effect upon the public right.,
26
Public nuisance claims typically must be brought by someone who
suffered an injury "different in kind and not merely in degree" from
the one suffered by the general public.27 Moreover, organizations
often cannot sue under public nuisance doctrine, unless the
organization itself has suffered a distinct injury (rather than a mere
injury to one of its members).28
Public nuisances often, or even typically, consist of environmental
harms.29 As one scholar notes, public nuisances are due to "the injury
a private use inflicts on public rights, which may occasionally mean
harm to real property owned by the public, but is more often an injury
to common pool resources, like silence, clean air or water, or species
diversity., 30 For example, in California ex rel. California Department
of Toxic Substances Control v. Campbell,3" plaintiffs sued under the
public nuisance doctrine for alleged contamination of the water under
the defendant's property. The Ninth Circuit held that "California law
imposes liability on any person who maintains a nuisance-regardless
of whether that person has an interest in the land," and that therefore
the defendants, as executors of an estate of someone who had polluted
the land in question, "maintained a nuisance by administering
property where hazardous chemicals were polluting the water.
32
26 Id.
27 See, e.g., Hark v. Mountain Fork Lumber Co., 34 S.E.2d 348, 354 (W. Va. 1945)
("Ordinarily, a suit to abate a public nuisance cannot be maintained by an individual in his
private capacity, as it is the duty of the proper public officials to vindicate the rights of the
public."); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821C cmt. b (1979) ("The private individual
can recover in tort for a public nuisance only if he has suffered harm of a different kind from
that suffered by other persons exercising the same public right. It is not enough that he has
suffered the same kind ofharm or interference but to a greater extent or degree.").
28 See, e.g., Med. Licensing Bd. of Ind. v. Ind. State Chiropractic Ass'n., 373 N.E.2d
1114, 1115-16 (Ind. Ct. App. 1978) (denying relief where injury would be to individual
members of a state chiropractic association, with no distinct injury to the association itself).
29 See, e.g., New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 473, 477 (1931) (enjoining City of New
York from "dumping garbage into the ocean or waters of the United States off the coast of New
Jersey" and thereby creating a "public nuisance"); W. PAGE KEETON, ET AL., PROSSER AND
KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 651 (W. Page Keeton, ed., 5th ed. 1984) (describing
environmental harms as a general type of public nuisance).
30 Louise A. Halper, Untangling the Nuisance Knot, 26 B.C. ENvTL. AFF. L. REV. 89, 96
(1998).
31 138 F.3d 772 (9th Cir. 1998).
32 1d. at 782; see also Carter v. Chotiner, 291 P. 577, 578 (Cal. 1930) (noting that polluted
water is a public nuisance); Selma Pressure Treating Co., Inc. v. Osmose Wood Preserving Co.
of America, 221 Cal. App. 3d 1601, 1619-20 (1990) (finding that anyone who contributes to a
nuisance is liable for its abatement and damages).
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B. Trespass
The trespass doctrine is often invoked in environmental claims. A
"trespass" is occurs when someone "enters land in the possession of
the other, or causes a thing . . . to do so, or remains on the land, or
fails to remove from the land a thing which he is under a duty to
remove." 33 Unlike the nuisance doctrine, no wrongful intent is
necessary; the mere fact of a trespass on one's land is enough. As the
Fourth Circuit has said, "It is, of course, among the most ancient of
common law doctrines that damage is presumed from a trespass to
land."
34
What is the practical difference between the activity that causes an
environmental trespass vs. that which causes an environmental
nuisance? Probably not much, in most real-world cases. As some
scholars note, the two doctrines "offer essentially the same
substantive rights, 3 5 and "[m]uch of the same conduct discussed in
conjunction with a nuisance action also supports a trespass action. 36
Courts have occasionally tried to draw a distinction, however, such as
the Alabama court that said that "[i]f the intruding agent could be
seen by the naked eye, the intrusion was considered a trespass. If the
agent could not be seen, it was considered indirect and less
substantial, hence, a nuisance. 37 Even then, some courts note that if
the intangible interference causes enough "substantial damage," it can
be deemed a trespass as well as a nuisance.38
C. Strict Liability
Where strict liability applies, harm and causation are the only real
prerequisites; if those are shown, the defendant is strictly liable for
the harm. The traditional strict liability action sprang from the classic
English case of Rylands v. Fletcher,39 which held that "the neighbour
who has brought something on his own property (which was not
33 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 158 (1965).
3 Alpine Forrest Partners v. Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp., 46 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA)
1251, 1255 n.8 (4th Cir. 1998) (noting that if a trespass existed, the plaintiff "was entitled to an
award of nominal damages notwithstanding its failure to prove actual damages").
35 J.B. Ruhl, Toxic Tort Remedies: The Case Against the 'Superduper Fund' and Other
Reform Proposals, 38 BAYLOR L. REV. 597, 609 (1986).
36 Joseph F. Falcone III & Daniel Utain, You Can Teach an Old Dog New Tricks: The
Application of Common Law in Present-Day Environmental Disputes, II VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 59,
69 (2000).
37 Borland v. Sanders Lead Co., 369 So.2d 523, 527 (Ala. 1979).
38 See, e.g., Gill v. LDI, 19 F. Supp.2d 1188, 1197-98 (W.D. Wash. 1998) (granting
summary judgment for trespass action after establishing that the defendant's activities caused
silt and rocks to invade the plaintiff's property).
39 3 L.R.E. & 1. App. 330 (1868).
626 [Vol. 58:3
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naturally there), harmless to others so long as it is confined to his own
property, but which he knows will be mischievous if it gets on his
neighbour's, should be obliged to make good the damage which
ensues if he does not succeed in confining it to his own property. ' '4
These days, strict liability may arise under the Second Restatement
of Torts, under which defendants can be held strictly liability for
harm caused by "abnormally dangerous" activities. Whether an
activity is "abnormally dangerous" is ascertained by six factors ("(a)
existence of a high degree of risk of some harm to the person, land or
chattel of others; (b) likelihood that the harm that results from it will
be great; (c) inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of
reasonable care; (d) extent to which the activity is not a matter of
common usage; (e) inappropriateness of the activity to the place
where it is carried on; and (f) extent to which its value to the
community is outweighed by its dangerous attributes."4 1 Strict
liability sometimes is embodied in state statutes as well.42
Strict liability is often, though by no means universally, used in the
environmental context. As Alexandra Klass noted in 2004, "twenty-
one out of twenty-seven jurisdictions that have squarely considered
the issue have extended the doctrine of strict liability to activities
resulting in environmental contamination," including courts in
Colorado, Iowa, New York, Minnesota, Ohio, and Florida.43 Based on
these numbers, she concluded that the current trend in environmental
cases is contrary to the trend elsewhere to "disfavor strict liability in
favor of negligence." 44  Klass emphasizes that even though
40 Id. at 340. For further discussion of the spread of this tort in the United States, see Jed
Handelsman Shugerman, The Floodgates of Strict Liability: Bursting Reservoirs and the
Adoption of Fletcher v. Rylands in the Gilded Age, 110 YALE L. J. 333 (2000).
41 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 (1977). For a critique of current doctrine, see
William K. Jones, Strict Liability for Hazardous Enterprise, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1705 (1992).
42 See, e.g., Aramark Uniform and Career Apparel, Inc. v. Easton, 894 So.2d 20, 26 (Fla.
2004) (interpreting Florida statute to create strict liability in case involving contamination of
plaintiff's property).
43 Alexandra B. Klass, From Reservoirs to Remediation: The Impact of CERCLA on
Common Law Strict Liability Environmental Claims, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 903, 957-58
(2004). That said, she reached this proportion ofjurisdictions by excluding some jurisdictions or
cases altogether, such as cases involving "subsequent owners" or "rejecting strict liability
completely." Id. at 958.
44 Id. at 961-62. Klass contrasts the current trend with the observations of numerous
scholars in previous decades. See id. at 934 n.133 (citing William R. Ginsberg & Lois Weiss,
Common Law Liability for Toxic Torts: A Phantom Remedy, 9 HOFSTRA L. REv. 859, 920
(1981) (concluding that "notions of fault die hard"); Frank E. Maloney, Judicial Protection of
the Environment: A New Role for Common-Law Remedies, 25 VAND. L. REV. 145, 151 (1972)
(noting that the limitation of strict liability to ultrahazardous or abnormally dangerous activities
"has severely limited its usefulness"); Gary Milhollin, Long-Term Liability for Environmental
Harm, 41 U. Prrr. L. REv. 1, 7 (1979) ("It will not be possible to convince the courts that all or
even most, polluting activities are ultrahazardous under a common law definition."); Jim C.
Chen & Kyle E. McSlarrow, Application of the Abnormally Dangerous Activities Doctrine to
2008]
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contamination is often subject to private suits under CERCLA,
plaintiffs "cannot recover any damages associated with diminution in
property value, lost profits, lost rents, personal injury, punitive
damages, or other damages that are often associated with
environmental contamination," which in turn means that "claims for
common law strict liability remain a crucial element of a plaintiffs
case, even if a statutory cause of action exits under state law, federal
law, or both. 'A4
Strict liability also comes into play in the oft-contested issue of
whether one landowner can sue the previous owner for environmental
damage caused to the land. As Joseph Falcone and Daniel Utain note,
"There is a jurisdictional split ... in determining whether a court will
allow a common law tort action against a previous owner who
polluted the land. Some jurisdictions will uphold a common law tort
action against a previous owner under strict liability, but not under
trespass or private nuisance.'46 The usual reason for denying such
liability is that if land buyers properly and fully inspect their
purchases, the marketplace will normally adjust the price of land to
account for existing environmental damage, which in turn means that
future liability for the seller could "negate the market's allocations of
resources and risks. 47
Thus, for example, in Kennedy Building Assoc. v. Viacom, Inc., 48 a
federal district court in a diversity case had awarded $225,000 in
compensatory damages and $5 million in punitive damages against
Environmental Cleanups, 47 Bus. LAW. 1031, 1032 (1992) ("[T]he recent decisions are
relatively scant and the abnormally dangerous activities doctrine has acquired no more than a
foothold in environmental cleanup litigation.")).
More broadly, Falcone and Utain observe that "modem allowance of such [common law]
causes of action is a far cry from the judicial attitude prior to CERCLA, in the early 1970s,
where 'such actions had never before been applied successfully to hazardous waste
contamination, and judicial interpretation of the relevant common law doctrines in other
environmental contexts had not favored plaintiffs."' Falcone & Utain, supra note 36, at 63-64
n.19 (quoting Tom Kuhnle, The Rebirth of Common Law Actions for Addressing Hazardous
Waste Contamination, 15 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 187, 188 (1996)).
45 Id. at 905.
46 Falcone & Utain, supra note 36, at 78.
47 Philadelphia Electric Co. v. Hercules, Inc., 762 F.2d 303, 314 (3d Cir. 1984). New
Jersey is one prominent exception. See, e.g., T&E Indus. v. Safety Light Corp., 587 A.2d 1249,
1255-59 (N.J. 1991) (extending strict liability to a property owner's claim against the previous
owner for contaminating the land); New Jersey Turnpike Auth. v. PPG Indus., Inc., 16 F.
Supp.2d 460, 478 (D.N.J. 1998) (noting that it is "more appropriate to employ newly developed
absolute liability theories than 'to endeavor to torture old remedies to fit factual patterns not
contemplated when those remedies were fashioned,"' and observing that New Jersey has
"moved away from common law claims such as trespass and nuisance in environmental
pollution cases") (quoting Kenney v. Scientific, Inc., 497 A.2d 1310, 1325 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law
Div. 1985)).
-8 375 F.3d 731 (8th Cir. 2004).
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Viacom, whose predecessor had owned a piece of property later
purchased by the plaintiff and had contaminated that property with
PCBs. 49 The Eighth Circuit overturned the district court on the
grounds that Minnesota law would probably not grant strict liability
in a situation involving a subsequent landowner. The court's
reasoning was that the Minnesota courts had recognized the
traditional rule that strict liability required an "escape" of the
dangerous substance from one place to another.5° Thus, when a
subsequent landowner was suing the previous owner over the same
piece of land, there had not been an "escape."'
D. Other Common Law Actions
Two additional common law actions are potential sources of
environmental remedies, although only in limited situations. First, the
traditional doctrine of "waste" allows shared users of property to seek
a remedy (damages or injunctive relief) against another property user
who damages the property. Thus, a landlord might sue a tenant for
engaging in some activity that damages the property, including
environmental harms.52 This doctrine is useful only in those situations
involving shared property interests in real estate, not more broadly.
Second, breach of contract actions can occasionally be used to
remedy environmental harms. In Jaasma v. Shell Oil Co.,53 for
example, Jaasma successfully sued Shell Oil Company, who had
formerly operated a gas station on her property, for breach of
contract.54 It turned out that gas had leaked from underground storage
tanks, leading to a 2.5 year investigation by the New Jersey
Department of Environmental Protection.55 Although the agency
eventually cleared the property, Jaasma was able to invoke several
different lease terms, such as a term requiring Shell to return the
property to her in its "original state," and a term requiring Shell to
obey all "environmental laws" and to indemnify Jaasma for any
damage from such a violation.
56
49 Id. at 735-36.
50 Id. at 741-42.
51 Id. at 742.
52 See, e.g., Lynda L. Butler, Defining a Water Ethic Through Comprehensive Reform: A
Suggested Framework for Analysis, 1986 U. ILL. L. REv. 439, 445 (1986); John A. Humbach,
Landlord Control of Tenant Behavior: An Instance of Private Environmental Legislation, 45
FORDHAM L. REv. 223, 258 n. 115 (1976).
53 412 F.3d 501 (3d Cir. 2005).
5 Id. at 502-03.
55 Id. at 503.
56 Id. at 504, 508.
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That said, contract actions are of little more use than the waste
doctrine, most obviously because such an action arises only when the
defendant actually is a party to a contract that creates liability. If gas
or dangerous chemicals leaked onto a neighbor's property, for
example, the neighbor could not invoke breach of contract against the
landowner (unless he demonstrated that he was an intended third
party beneficiary of some contract that the landowner had with
someone else, which is rather unlikely). In addition, any contract
recovery is likely to be limited to actual pieces of land-after all,
upstream polluters are not likely to have entered into contracts with
downstream consumers of water or air promising to avoid
environmental harm.
II. STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF THE COMMON LAW
Does the common law "work" in environmental cases? I'm
agnostic on this question, for two reasons.
First, what does it even mean for a legal institution to "work" in
this context? What is the overall goal here? Is it simply to gain the
maximal amount of environmental protection, at whatever cost? Or
are we trying to decide which legal institution (or combination
thereof) will lead to the highest point at which the marginal cost of
additional protection exceeds the marginal benefit? Or are we looking
for a legal institution that, in addition to protecting the environment
(to some extent), also serves some other value or combination of
values (i.e., reducing private transaction costs in bargaining to an
efficient solution, reducing rent-seeking, enhancing community
participation, tailoring decisions to the particulars of each locality)?
After all, we can't agree on how well the common law achieves a
particular end unless we first agree on what that end is.
Second, there's little solid empirical evidence as to how much the
common law can protect environmental values. As Roger Meiners
and Bruce Yandle concede, "In 1972, there was no reliable water
quality data base that focused on specific rivers, lakes, and coastal
waters. That is, no one knew the magnitude of the gap between the
existing quality of water and the goals to be accomplished., 5 7 While
Meiners and Yandle make this observation in the middle of a larger
article arguing that the Clean Water Act was unnecessary in light of
common law actions, the point leads to agnosticism about the
common law's effectiveness: If "no reliable" data existed prior to the
57 Roger E. Meiners and Bruce Yandle, Clean Water Legislation: Reauthorize or Repeal?,
in Roger E. Meiners and Bruce Yandle, eds., TAKING THE ENVIRONMENT SERIOUSLY 73, 76
(1993).
[Vol. 58:3
IN THE COURTS
Clean Water Act, how can one have any empirical basis for
comparing the common law to the Clean Water Act?5
8
The best collection of empirical evidence as to air pollution prior
to the era of federalization is Indur Goklany's Clearing the Air.59 In
charts compiled from numerous data sources, Goklany demonstrates
that a few types of air pollution (including particulate matter and
sulfur dioxide) saw "significant improvement" before the Clean Air
Act of 1970 "became effective" 60 -i.e., during an era when the
common law may have been the main source of environmental
protection. That said, Goklany often seems to credit technological and
economic advances for past improvements in pollution controls, 61 and
an endnote expressly noted that the rate of pollution improvement can
be expected to slow down over time (for the usual reason that the
"easiest and cheapest reductions are obtained [first]"). 62 This implies
that even if the rate of pollution improvement was higher during the
common law era than since the 1970s, this could merely be because
the common law era came first. In any event, as best as I can tell,
Goklany does not directly ascribe pre-1970 pollution improvements
to the common law. In contrast to Goklany, Joel Franklin Brenner's
study of the Industrial Revolution era in England took a definite
opinion of the common law, suggesting that, at least at the time, it did
not do a good job of controlling the "pollution of the air and water." 63
So we are left with the claim that courts have protected
environmental interests in some specific cases.64 That kind of
anecdotal evidence only gets you so far. If you want to make any
more weighty claim as to how often the common law protects the
environment as compared to statutory or regulatory regimes, what
you would need is something more like this:
1) Find good, solid, and consistently measured data showing
the levels of a particular type of environmental harm (say,
particulate matter in the air, or levels of chemicals in
58 See also Roger E. Meiners and Bruce Yandle, Common Law and the Conceit of Modern
Environmental Policy, 7 GEO. MASON L. REv. 923 (1999).
59 INDUR GOKLANY, CLEARING THE AIR: THE REAL STORY OF THE WAR ON AIR
POLLUTION (1999).
- Id. at 52-53, 57.
61 See, e.g., id. at 5, 83.
62 Id. at 2 n.11.
63 Joel Franklin Brenner, Nuisance Law and the Industrial Revolution, 3 J. LEGAL STUD.
403, 408, 424-25 (1974); see also N. William Hines, Nor Any Drop to Drink: Public Regulation
of Water Quality, 52 IOWA L. REv. 186, 186 (1966) (arguing that the common law was
incapable of adequately protecting environmental concerns).
64 See, e.g., Karol Boudreaux and Bruce Yandle, Public Bads and Public Nuisance:
Common Law Remedies for Environmental Decline, 14 FORDHAM ENvTL. L.J. 55, 67-86
(2002).
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groundwater) in 20 (preferably more) jurisdictions over a
period of at least 20 years under a common law system (a
time period that would hopefully be long enough to detect
and control for underlying long-term trends).
2) Let half or so of the jurisdictions adopt enact
environmental regulation at some point.
3) Then, let the same data be collected over the next 10 or 20
years to determine what exactly happened in those
jurisdictions-whether the levels of that specific type of
pollution went up, down, or remained unchanged, in
comparison to the jurisdictions that still retained a primary
role for common law actions.
Of course, you'd also have to have reliable data for that entire time
period for all of the other factors that might affect the levels of
pollution-say, economic growth, population growth, exogenous
introductions of new technologies (this could be a cross-correlated
variable, in that the legal or regulatory response to pollution could
create incentives for technological advancement), industrial
development or declines thereof, and so forth.
All of this, of course, goes only to the level of protection that a
legal institution would provide. But at what cost? If a legal institution
provides X more dollars of protection at a cost of 5X, fans of the
precautionary principle would be unfazed, but the rest of us might
find it useful to know whether a move towards that institution was
cost-justified.
Thus, to know whether the common law is superior to agency
regulation, we'd also need to have empirical evidence as to the
enforcement costs and the direct and indirect costs of compliance
with each regime. For example, many risk-averse businesspeople
might strongly prefer a uniform federal regulation over a common
law system in which well-heeled plaintiffs' firms can cherry-pick
jurisdictions (say, Beaumont, Texas) in which juries might (or might
not) level huge damage awards for a pattern of nationwide conduct.
Both because of risk-averseness, and because of the desire not to have
a nationwide operation subjected to 50 potentially different standards,
corporations usually argue strenuously on behalf of federal
preemption of state common law.65
65 See, e.g., Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000) (holding that
federal transportation regulations preempted state tort law holding Honda liable for conduct that
was allowed under the federal agency's phase-in of new regulatory requirements).
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To my knowledge, no one has done a study that is remotely like
what I have described. And I doubt that anyone can. Not only is there
insufficient data for the common law era, where good data is
available in more recent years, environmental law has already been
federalized to such an extent that there are no state common law
regimes to use as a comparison (none, that is, that exist apart from the
overriding effect of federal law).
One can imagine a study comparing the 21 or so states with strict
liability for environmental offenses to the rest that lack such a
common law remedy. Such a study might be very useful, particularly
if a researcher were able to obtain state-level panel data for a lengthy
time period that covered both sides of various dates when individual
states adopted strict liability for the first time. Still, even such a study
would have to be conducted against a massive backdrop of dozens of
federal and state statutes and agency regulations. Thus, such a study
would not conclusively demonstrate that the common law, in and of
itself, is up to the task of environmental protection (assuming that we
could all agree on what "up to the task" even means).
So what have we then? In what ways do we have reason to suspect
that the common law might do a good job? And where can we venture
a hesitant guess that it faces significant limitations? That is what the
next Part attempts to address.
III. ADVANTAGES AND LIMITATIONS OF THE COMMON LAW
In a 1984 article, Steven Shavell described four factors that aid us
in comparing common law liability to regulation.66 These factors are:
(1) knowledge about risky activities, (2) the ability of private parties
to pay for harm, (3) the chance that private parties would not face the
threat of a lawsuit, and (4) the administrative costs incurred by private
parties and the public.67 As I discuss below, these factors lead in
different directions and are potentially incommensurable.
A. Knowledge about Risky Activities
The first factor-knowledge about risky activities-may lean
toward the common law. That is, private parties will probably have
better information than regulators about such factors as "the benefits
of activities, the costs of reducing risks, or the probability or severity
66 See Steven Shavell, Liability for Harm Versus Regulation of Safety, 13 J. LEGAL STUD.
357 (1984). I'm not going to address the independent flaws-of which there are many-of
administrative regulation (i.e., regulatory capture, ossification, a myopic focus on a non-optimal
set of risks, and so forth).
67 Id. at 359-64.
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of the risks." 68 To the extent that private parties do have better
information in this regard, and to the extent that courts can determine
the right level of liability after the fact, then-Shavell concludes-a
common law system of liability would lead the private parties to
exercise the appropriate level of care.
69
Those are big "ifs," however. First, do private parties really have
superior information? They may have superior information about
their own compliance costs, to be sure, but do they really have
superior information about more general issues of environmental
consequences? Does a farmer (for example) have superior knowledge,
as compared to an expert agency, about all the possible environmental
and health consequences of hundreds of different pesticides that could
potentially be used? The suggestion seems doubtful. Does a polluting
company have superior information about the way in which its
emissions could seep into the watershed and ultimately affect the
mating patterns of an endangered species two states away? Again,
doubtful.
Second, do courts have superior information? Let me put forth the
best case for both sides of this question. On the pro-agency side: It
seems unlikely that the average jury has better information than do
PhD chemical engineers working for the EPA about how to treat NOx
emissions from diesel engines. As for judges, they are at least likely
to be drawn from the educated sector of the population, but they still
are generalists. In a single week, they might have to read briefs from
eight different cases that turn on questions of ERISA, bankruptcy law,
the United States Sentencing Guidelines, breach of contract, the
Fourth Amendment, immigration law, the Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act, and section 10(b)(5) of the SEC's regulations.7°
Thus, when the average judge faces a lawsuit over pollution, it
very well could be the first time in his life that he has heard the term
"PM."' 7' As the Supreme Court noted, "The invocation of federal
68 Id. at 359.
69 Id.
70 My list reflects cases that may arise under federal law, but I have little doubt that state
court judges face a similar diversity of cases.
71 Cf Cass R. Sunstein, Panel I: Public Versus Private Environmental Regulation, 21
ECOLOGY L.Q. 455, 456 (1994) (pointing to the "lack of necessary expertise in the judiciary" in
various environmental cases); Richard Lazarus, Panel H: Public Versus Private Environmental
Regulation, 21 ECOLOGY L.Q. 438, 441 (1994) (contending that "courts simply do not have the
technological . . . expertise to make these [environmental protection] decisions"); Andrew
McFee Thompson, Free Market Environmentalism and the Common Law: Confusion,
Nostalgia, and Inconsistency, 45 EMORY L.J. 1329, 1362 (1996) ("One of the most frequently
noted shortcomings in a system of private environmental regulation is its complete reliance on
generalist judges who lack the training and expertise to evaluate the complex and technical
evidence that overwhelms many common law actions for environmental harm.").
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common law by the District Court and the Court of Appeals in the
face of congressional legislation supplanting it is peculiarly
inappropriate in areas as complex as water pollution control.... Not
only are the technical problems difficult-doubtless the reason
Congress vested authority to administer the Act in administrative
agencies possessing the necessary expertise-but the general area is
particularly unsuited to the approach inevitable under a regime of
federal common law." 72 Or as the D.C. Circuit observed, "Judges,
both trial and appellate, have no special competence to resolve the
complex and refractory causal issues raised by the attempt to link
low-level exposure to toxic chemicals with human disease. On
questions such as these, which stand at the frontier of current medical
and epidemiological inquiry, if experts are willing to testify that such
a link exists, it is for the jury to decide whether to credit such
testimony. ,
73
On the pro-court side, however, the very fact that judges lack
specialized expertise could be viewed as a plus, under the right
circumstances. Perhaps the experts in administrative agencies tend to
have distorted perspectives from having spent their entire careers
studying a particular form of environmental harm. That is, they may
be subject to self-serving bias: Few people want to feel that their lives
have been wasted mastering a subject that is of trivial value, and so
they exaggerate the importance of that subject to society at large. As a
result, perhaps the agency experts who have put their lives and souls
into studying a particular type of emissions are tempted to regulate it
into the ground, while ignoring the question whether such regulation
is the best use of society's resources.
Correspondingly, perhaps it takes a well-educated, generalist
outsider-i.e., the ideal of a judge-to look more dispassionately at
whether it has really been proven that the mighty hand of the
government ought to smite those who failed to take due care to avoid
a particular type of environmental harm. Both sides can produce
studies and expert testimony, but at the end of the day, the outcome
will depend on which side manages to explain and justify its position
to an impartial outsider.
72 City of Milwaukee vs. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 325 (1981). The Supreme Court also
quoted the district judge in the case as having observed, "[i]t is well known to all of us that the
arcane subject matter of some of the expert testimony in this case was sometimes over the heads
of all of us to one height or another. I would certainly be less than candid if I did not
acknowledge that my grasp of some of the testimony was less complete than I would like it to
be."
73 Ferebee v. Chevron Chemical Co., 736 F.2d 1529, 1534 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
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Indeed, I sometimes wonder whether the complexity of
environmental cases is overstated. Epidemiological studies may
require background study and some close reading, but they are no
more incomprehensible than the property law doctrines that each first-
year law student is expected to learn. Think of the famous story of
Nobel-winning physicist Richard Feynman, who "was once asked by
a Caltech faculty member to explain why spin one-half particles obey
Fermi Dirac statistics. Rising to the challenge, he said, 'I'll prepare a
freshman lecture on it.' But a few days later he told the faculty
member, 'You know, I couldn't do it. I couldn't reduce it to the
freshman level. That means we really don't understand it.' ' 74 If the
rationale for an environmental lawsuit can't be boiled down into
terms that an educated judge can understand, then perhaps the
rationale isn't such a good one.
In sum, I'm not sure whether courts are systematically better or
worse than regulatory agencies in how they come to grips with
complex sources of information. It all depends on the court, the
agency, and the issue at hand.
B. Ability to Pay
This factor is simple: Any given polluter might not be able to pay
for any harm that it might have caused. This could be because the
damage is greater than anything that the polluter can afford to pay, or
because of insolvency that arose for any other reason. In either event,
this factor weighs against the common law: If the main bar against
pollution is that the potential polluter might someday face the threat
of a lawsuit, then a potential polluter will tend to ignore risks for
which liability would exceed the ability to pay. Lawsuits could still
seek injunctive relief, of course, but plaintiffs' lawyers would have
less of an incentive to bring such cases (and this is assuming that they
could be compensated for their attorneys' fees in the event that they
won an injunction).75 Most forms of regulation, on the other hand,
would require the polluter to meet certain standards from Day One, or
possibly to buy pollution permits up front.
74 See Richard M. Reis, Making Science Understandable to a Broad Audience,
CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUCATION, July 23, 1999, http://chronicle.com/jobs/v45/i47/
4547ctlyst.htm.
73 See, e.g., City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557 (1992) (noting the availability of
such relief under a federal statute).
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C. The Chance That There Will Be No Finding of Liability
Notice that I have redefined Shavell's third category to include not
just the chance that a lawsuit will be filed, but the chance that a
lawsuit will succeed. Put a different way, Gillette and Krier divide
this category into "process bias" and "access bias".-"process bias"
refers to "factors that work systematically for or against the interests
of plaintiffs once their public risk claims reach the courtroom," while
"access bias" refers to "factors that work systematically for or against
the interests of plaintiffs as they seek to get their public risk claims
into court in the first place. 76
This category is far broader than the first two. Take access bias.
First, before any lawsuit can be filed, the plaintiffs have to know that
environmental damage has occurred, and who caused it. 77 In many
cases this may not be a problem, but some cases, people will simply
have no idea whether there are particular toxins in the air or water (let
alone that a particular species is endangered). Even if they notice that
the well water has a slightly different taste, or that they are wheezing
a bit more than normal, they may have no way of knowing where the
pollution ultimately came from. Thus, in the common law era in
nineteenth-century Britain, says Noga Morag-Levine, the difficulty of
establishing the source of pollution "led major landowners to abandon
their quest for judicial relief," and "physically able individuals could
even find employment as runners who would painstakingly, and often
unsuccessfully, attempt to follow emissions to their source. 78
Today, we are a bit better off: the role of emissions monitoring is
typically performed by administrative agencies rather than private
runners. 79 Still, even in today's world, it seems plausible that there are
some potential plaintiffs who never become aware that they have a
potentially viable legal claim against a defendant that caused
environmental harm.
76 Clayton P. Gillette, & James E. Krier, Risk, Courts, and Agencies, 138 U. PA. L. REV.
1027, 1044-45 (1990) (emphasis omitted); see also J.B. Ruhl, Toxic Tort Remedies: The Case
Against the 'Superduper Fund' and Other Reform Proposals, 38 BAYLOR L. REv. 597, 616-17
(1986) ("The private law system poses hurdles for each potential plaintiff, including (1)
requiring a plaintiff.., to identify and sue a defendant allegedly responsible for the plaintiffs
injury; (2) the requirement . . . [of the] statutes of limitations; (3) the requirement that the
plaintiff prove the defendant's wrongful conduct caused the injury .. .and (4) the inevitable
complications of litigation.").
77 See Shavell, supra note 66, at 359.
78 NOGA MORAG LEVINE, CHASING THE WIND: REGULATING AIR POLLUTION IN THE
COMMON LAW STATE 49 (2003).
79 See, e.g., U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Air Pollution Monitoring,
http://www.epa.gov/ebtpages/airairpollutionmonitoring.html.
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Overall? Mark this factor down as of unknown effect. If we moved
to a predominately common law system, would-be plaintiffs would be
at an informational disadvantage. But one can imagine a continued
informational role for expert administrative agencies in such a world,
i.e., monitoring emissions, collecting and analyzing information,
publishing studies about various types of pollution, and perhaps even
contacting potential plaintiffs to let them know that a legal claim
might be available. Who knows what the ultimate result would be.
Second, the free rider problem is well-known: if one person brings
suit, neighbors who might also benefit from the lawsuit have a lesser
incentive to participate in the costs of litigation.8 ° On the other hand,
the class action mechanism is one way of mitigating that problem,
i.e., by increasing the possible award of damages, thereby increasing
the incentive and ability for plaintiffs' lawyers to take the case in the
first place.8'
Let's move to process bias. What are the factors that would bias
the way in which environmental plaintiffs win or lose lawsuits? At the
initial stage, the plaintiff typically has to meet standing requirements.
In federal courts, at least, standing requirements can be used to kick
out cases in which the plaintiff has failed to allege an individualized
injury, or has failed to show that the court could redress the alleged
82 Ti atrinjury, This factor, by the way, casts doubt on whether the common
law could ever protect endangered species with any appreciable
effectiveness-the very people who are most likely to have standing
(i.e., because they have some connection to a species that lives on
their land) are not likely to be potential plaintiffs.
Also at the initial stage, the plaintiff has to show that the conduct
occurred within the relevant statute of limitations.83  Some
jurisdictions may recognize a "continuing tort" theory, which would
treat an environmental harm as an ongoing phenomenon for which
damages could be paid as to the most recent harm, even though the
original harm may have begun long outside the statute of limitations
period. 4 But others do not recognize such a theory. For example, in
Highland Industrial Park, Inc. v. BEI Defense Systems Co.,85
Highland Industrial Park sued a former tenant in July 1999, after
80 See, e.g., Gillette & Krier, supra note 76, at 1046-50.
S See Shavell, supra note 66, at 363.
82 See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984) ("A plaintiff must allege personal injury
fairly traceable to the defendant's allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed by the
requested relief."); Florida Audubon Soc'y v. Bentsen, 94 F.3d 658, 666 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
83 See Shavell, supra note 66, at 363.
84 This used to be the case in New York, see, e.g., Amax, Inc. v. Sohio Indus. Prods. Co.,
469 N.Y.S.2d 282, 284-85 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1983).
85 357 F.3d 794 (8th Cir. 2004).
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finding in 1996 and 1997 that the tenant's former practice of burning
waste from rocket component production had contaminated the
groundwater in that area.86 The suit was brought under Arkansas
common law tort theories of negligence and trespass.87 The Eighth
Circuit held that the claim was barred by Arkansas' three-year statute
of limitations for tort claims, because Highland Park had been put on
notice both in 1991 and in 1996 that there had been soil
88contamination. Highland argued that the contamination constituted a
"continuing trespass," but the Eighth Circuit noted that Arkansas law
did not recognize a "continuing-tort theory. '89 Additionally, the
district court had found that the statute of limitations did not begin to
run until 1997, "because it was not until then that Highland knew the
nature and extent of its injury."90 The Eighth Circuit rejected this
theory as well, noting that "we know of no state whatever in which an
injured party must know the full extent of the damages that it may
recover before the statute of limitations begins to run on its claim."9'
Indeed, even where state law does recognize continuing violations,
at least in theory, courts may still find that the claims are precluded.
For example, in Skokomish Indian Tribe v. United States,92 an Indian
tribe brought suit in federal district court against the United States and
various state entities for environmental harms allegedly caused by a
hydroelectric dam built in 1930. 93 As to the state law claims at issue
(including trespass, negligence, conversion, and nuisance), the Ninth
Circuit noted that the state statute of limitations was three years,94 and
that the Tribe was on notice of its claimed harm from aggradation of
the river (i.e., the deposit of sediment) no later than 1989, when its
attorney had written a letter to the Washington Department of
Ecology dealing with that very issue.95 The Tribe claimed that the
trespass at issue was a continuing violation, a claim that, if successful,
would have at least allowed the Tribe to recover for the preceding
three years of damage before the suit was filed.96 But the court noted
that the Tribe had failed to make a showing required by state law to
invoke the continuing violation theory, i.e., that the damage had been
8 Id. at 795-96.
87 Id. at 796.
88 Id. at 797.
89 Id.; See also Syms v. Olin Corp., 408 F.3d 95, 110 (2d Cir. 2005) (barring tort claims as
to property contamination because New York law no longer recognized continuing violations).
90 Highland, 357 F.3d at 796.
91 Id. at 797.
92 410 F.3d 506 (9th Cir. 2005).
93 Id. at 509-10.
94 Id. at 516.
95 Id. at 517-18.
96 Id. at 518.
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"reasonably abatable." 97 The theory is that if the damage is caused by
a one-time event that can't be reversed or abated, then the statute of
limitations begins to run at the time of that event; while a truly
"continuing" tort consists of something more like a repeated act that
causes harm.
98
After a plaintiff has scaled the hurdles of standing and statutes of
limitations, the merits of the case still have to be demonstrated. This
is as it should be, of course. It's a good thing if the legal system
focuses its regulatory energies on those activities that are provably
tied to individual harm. Still, plaintiffs can fail to prove their cases for
many reasons other than the actual merits of the case-the capricious
intuitions or biases of the judge and jury, the inability to pay for an
expert who appears convincing and polished on the witness stand, or
poor litigation skills by the plaintiffs' lawyers (this could be anything
from a rambling brief to the inadvertent waiver of important legal
arguments). In addition, meeting the burden of proof both as to
unreasonableness and as to causation may be especially difficult in
cases involving diffuse and low-level environmental harms, even
though such harms may turn out to be more serious than dangers that
are more salient at the moment.
On other occasions, environmental common law claims can run
into technical obstacles, i.e., the particular plaintiffs fail to meet some
doctrinal qualification. For example, in Parker v. Scrap Metal
Processors, Inc. ,99 the district court had awarded Mrs. Parker and her
two adult children a total of $1.5 million in compensatory and
punitive damages based on violations of the Clean Water Act,
negligence, trespass, and nuisance, because the hazardous waste
stored in drums and underground storage tanks had contaminated the
Parkers' property. 00 Although Mrs. Parker's children had been made
co-tenants as to the property in question, the Eighth Circuit reversed
the district court's damages award to the children, noting that the
children did not have a "property right in their mother's property at
the time the complaint was filed."''1 1
97 Id.
98 But see State v. Kermit Lumber & Pressure Treating Co., 488 S.E.2d 901, 925 n.29 (W.
Va. 1997) (holding that while generally a "continuing tort sufficient to toll a statute of
limitations is occasioned by continual unlawful acts, not by continual ill effects from an original
violation," this "general proposition" is "unworkable in the context of a public nuisance action
to remediate a business site containing hazardous waste which is endangering the 'public health,
safety and the environment."') (emphasis omitted).
- 386 F.3d 993 (1 1th Cir. 2004).
10Id. at 1000-02.
101 Id. at 10 18-19 & n.32; cf Alpine Forrest Partners v. Crown Central Petroleum Corp.,
No. 95-1871, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 1732, at *9 (4th Cir. 1998) ("[T]here was evidence from
which the jury could find that the discharge had completely ended before Alpine Forrest bought
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Even if the plaintiff has a good case on the merits, common law
courts have sometimes let the defendant escape liability on the ground
that the defendant's economic activity was too valuable to the
community. Two of the cases cited by Todd Zywicki 10 2 are useful
examples. In Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Sanderson,10 3 the plaintiffs
alleged that the Pennsylvania Coal Company had polluted a nearby
river, but the court denied relief, on the theory that coal mining was of
such importance that "mere private personal inconvenience ... must
yield to the necessities of a great public industry, which, although in
the hands of a private corporation, subserves a great public interest.
To encourage the development of the great natural resources of a
country trifling inconveniences to particular persons must sometimes
give way to the necessities of a great community."' 4 Similarly, in a
Great Depression case-Versailles Borough v. McKeesport Coal &
Coke Co. 105-plaintiffs sued a mining company for the harm
allegedly caused by burning the byproducts of mining. The court
noted that "the annoyance which is theirs is trivial in comparison to
the positive harm and damage that would be done to the community,
were the injunction asked for granted.' 0 6
To be sure, the fact that the common law can be tailored to local
circumstances can be an advantage; as Todd Zywicki points out,
judges can "consider the exigencies of the situation and location that
are relevant to the specific community in question," as well as "other
values and norms unique to the community in question.'
0 7
Nonetheless, this factor is a bit of a one-way ratchet-it provides a
reason for courts to deny liability even as to otherwise-meritorious
claims, while there is no countervailing factor that would allow courts
the property. The right to sue on account of a completed tort is not conveyed sub silentio in a
deed of realty. It is a chose in action, which is a personal right that must be specifically
assigned.").
102 See Todd J. Zywicki, A Unanimity-Reinforcing Model of Efficiency in the Common
Law: An Institutional Comparison of Common Law and Legislative Solutions to Large-Number
Externality Problems, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 961 (1996).
1036 A. 453 (Pa. 1886), criticized by Commonwealth v. Barnes & Tucker Co., 319 A.2d
871 (Pa. 1974).
104 Id. at 458-59.
105 83 PITTSBURGH LEGAL J. 379 (Allegheny Cty. Ct. 1935).
106 Id. at 383.
107 Zywicki, supra note 102, at 1016. See also Frona M. Powell, Trespass, Nuisance, and
the Evolution of Common Law in Modem Pollution Cases, 21 REAL ESTATE L.J. 182, 183-84
(1992) ("Common-law tort theory is sometimes criticized as too slow or too uncertain to resolve
the technologically-induced problems of environmental pollution. To some extent, this
uncertainty is a result of the inherent flexibility and adaptability of common-law theory in
adjudication of individual disputes under the common law, characteristics of the common law
that permit courts substantial discretion in reformulating legal theory to address the unique
factual or policy considerations in individual cases." (citation omitted)).
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to impose liability on deserving defendants absent an injured plaintiff
who has filed suit within the statute of limitations.
Global warming may be the prime example of environmental harm
that is not likely to be addressed by common law courts, at least not
very well. 108 Assume for the moment that the direst predictions are
true: global warming is occurring; the earth will rise in temperature
by several degrees Celsius over the next 50 years; and this is all or
mostly due to humanity's carbon emissions. What can courts do about
such a situation? For one thing, we all emit carbon in some form,
even if only by exhaling. Those of us who live in the industrialized
world do quite a bit more: the vast majority of us drive automobiles;
we use electricity to heat and cool our houses; we fly across country
on business; and more. So if there is to be a lawsuit over global
warming, the most basic question is: who should sue whom? Perhaps
the entire Pacific Rim, as a class, should sue the entire industrialized
world, as a defendant class, but it seems rather unlikely that any court
would be able or willing to apportion liability, or even to keep track
of the docket entries.
Not surprisingly, the global warming lawsuits to date have tended
to get kicked out for lack of standing, 109 or even political question
grounds. In Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co.,' 10 several states sued
power companies under "federal common law public nuisance actions
108 See PERC Reports, Global Warming: A Dialogue-Should Victims Receive
Compensation?, http://www.perc.org/publications/percreports/march2005/global-warming.php
(last visited Feb. 8, 2008); Daniel C. Esty, Toward Optimal Environmental Governance, 74
N.Y.U. L. REv. 1495, 1535 (1999) ("Climate change represents the ultimate degree of
complexity and difficulty in environmental protection. The harms-a buildup of greenhouse
gases in the atmosphere potentially causing global warming, increased intensity of windstorms
and other extreme weather events, changes in rainfall patterns, and sea level rise-can be traced
to the activities of virtually every industrial facility, vehicle, and individual on the planet."
(citation omitted)).
109See, e.g., Korsinsky v. United States EPA, No. 05 Ci. 859 (NRB), 2005 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 21778, at *7-*10 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2005) (denying standing to sue defendants for
contributing to global warming because the plaintiff's alleged grievance was "generalized");
Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Abraham, 218 F. Supp. 2d 1143, 1155 (N.D. Cal. 2002) ("The
concerns presented regarding global warming are too general, too unsubstantiated, too unlikely
to be caused by defendants' conduct, and/or too unlikely to be redressed by the relief sought to
confer standing."); Found. on Econ. Trends v. Watkins, 794 F. Supp. 395, 398 (D.D.C. 1992)
(denying standing to plaintiffs who claimed that various agencies' "failure to consider the
effects on global warming of specific federal actions and programs under their authority has
harmed plaintiffs' programmatic activities in disseminating information about the greenhouse
effect to the public"). But see Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Watson, No. C 02-4106 JSW, 2005
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42335, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 2005) (allowing standing for plaintiffs who
claimed that two federal agencies "have provided assistance to particular projects that contribute
to climate change without complying with the requirements of the NEPA and the APA"). In a
case where the judges split their opinions, Judge Douglas Ginsburg would have denied standing
to "anyone with the wit to shout 'global warming' in a crowded courthouse." City of Los
Angeles v. NHTSA, 912 F.2d 478, 483-84 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
110406 F. Supp. 2d 265 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
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to abate what they allege to be Defendants' contributions to... global
warming," i.e., the defendants' collective emission of "650 million
tons of carbon dioxide gas annually.""' The court, however,
dismissed their claims on the ground that the global warming question
was a "non-justiciable political question," ' 1 2 in that to resolve such a
nuisance claim, the court would need to determinate a cap for carbon
dioxide emissions, "create a schedule to implement those reductions,"
coordinate the relief with "the United States' ongoing negotiations
with other nations concerning global climate change," and other
questions of sheer policy.13
Even a suit that survives dismissal will likely be viewed with a
skeptical eye, as can be seen in a federal district judge's recent
opinion observing that there would be
daunting evidentiary problems for anyone who undertakes to
prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, the degree to
which global warming is caused by the emission of
greenhouse gasses; the degree to which the actions of any
individual oil company, any individual chemical company, or
the collective action of these corporations contribute, through
the emission of greenhouse gasses, to global warming; and
the extent to which the emission of greenhouse gasses by
these defendants, through the phenomenon of global
warming, intensified or otherwise affected the weather
system that produced Hurricane Katrina. 1
4
D. Administrative Costs
As Shavell points out, the level of administrative costs may favor
the common law, which incurs administrative costs "only if harm
occurs.""' 5 Indeed, if the system of liability leads "parties to take
proper care and this happens to remove all possibility of harm, there
would be no suits whatever."" 6 (An optimistic assumption, to be sure;
even under a strict liability system, parties would presumably still
undertake polluting activities that were cost-justified, and thus would
still create harm that might lead to a lawsuit.) On the flip side,
SId. at 268.
112d. at 273.
1ld. at 272-73
14 Comer v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., No. 1:05CV436 LTS-RHW, 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 33123, at *12 (S.D. Miss. Feb. 23, 2006).
"5 Shavell, supra note 66, at 364.
116 Id
.
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"administrative costs are incurred whether or not harm occurs," and
even if the regulation eliminates the risk of harm, "administrative
costs will have been borne in the process."'
' 17
E. Courts as Policymakers
In addition to Shavell's four factors, one might also add a general
note of skepticism about the notion that courts should decide weighty
matters of environmental policy, all unto themselves. However much
a court may wish to avoid such policy matters, 118 it cannot do so.
Technically, a case arises when a plaintiff sues a defendant over a
particular harm, but the court cannot stop there. If the standard is
strict liability, for example, the court will have to determine whether
the defendant's activity was "abnormally dangerous," an inquiry that
may take into account the commonness of the activity and/or the
value that it might produce. If the standard is negligence, the court
may need to consider whether the defendant's actions were
reasonable, an open-ended inquiry that will likely take into account
the court's underlying intuitions about what sort of business conduct
is reasonable in light of community needs. As the Supreme Court has
recognized, to resolve typical air pollution cases, courts must strike a
balance "between interests seeking strict schemes to reduce pollution
rapidly to eliminate its social costs and interests advancing the
economic concern that strict schemes [will] retard industrial
development with attendant social costs."' 
19
Now if some common law advocates got their wish, regulatory
agencies would apparently be replaced (entirely?) by common law
actions. But do we have reason to believe that courts should be the
only governmental vehicles for setting wide-ranging social policy as
to environmental law? Administrative regulation has plenty of
disadvantages-that's a subject unto itself-but it doesn't seem likely
that common law courts are going to establish the right level of
environmental liability (assuming that such a thing exists) by
assessing liability in the right cases.
It's this latter bit that troubles me. Let's assume for the sake of
argument that judges and juries are eminently wise, unbiased, able to
comprehend all manner of complex environmental claims regardless
of how well or poorly the parties litigate the cases, and able both to
1171d
118 Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870, 871 (N.Y. 1970) ("A court should not
try to [regulate] on its own as a by-product of private litigation... [or] lay down and implement
an effective policy for the elimination of air pollution. This is an area beyond the circumference
of one private lawsuit.").
119 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 847 (1984).
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discern and to craft just the remedy that perfectly leads even non-
parties to take cost-justified measures of environmental protection (no
more, no less).
Still, judges and juries can't take any action until someone files a
lawsuit. And I mean no unique criticism of the plaintiffs' bar when I
say that their case-selection patterns are calculated more in self-
interest than in service of a coherent regulatory policy. The plaintiffs'
bar is drawn to cases that are likely to lead to damages high enough to
provide a contingency fee that, in turn, would be high enough to
recompense the lawyers for their time and money spent investigating
and litigating the case, plus a profit. 120 As Peter Huber points out, "the
most attractive risks are those for which the evidence is the most
unusual and lurid, the class to be represented the largest, and the
problems of proof the lowest. According to these criteria, the risks
that happen to land at the top of the list are not likely to be those that
would be selected by risk experts engaged in a sober examination of
the competing sources of risk in a market filled with a rich variety of
hazardous substitutes."'
12 1
In other words, the plaintiffs' bar piles on when it perceives high
liability and easy victories in high-profile accident cases-several
hundred lawsuits, most including common law claims, were
successfully brought against Exxon for its infamous oil spill 122 -
while slighting more difficult-to-prove cases involving slight
increases in pollution and the mere prospect of long-term
environmental damage. 123 The common law bankrupts Dow Coming
for making silicon breast implants that turn out to be harmless, while
relatively ignoring pollution that might pose a slight increase in
mercury contamination of the fish population in other states. As
mentioned above, no matter how serious a problem global warming is
or might become one day, plaintiffs' lawyers are unlikely to invest
millions of dollars in a quixotic effort to pin liability on a few
companies for events that may take place 50 or 100 years from now.
Thus, as Peter Huber has argued, "A massive delegation of
consensus-forging responsibilities to the courts and private litigators
120 Gillette & Krier, supra note 76, at 1051-52.
121 Peter Huber, Safety and the Second Best: The Hazards of Public Risk Management in
the Courts, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 277, 318 (1985). In the interest of full disclosure, I currently
work for the law firm that Peter Huber co-founded.
122 Andrew McFee Thompson, Comment, Free Market Environmentalism and the
Common Law: Confusion, Nostalgia, and Inconsistency, 45 EMORY L.J. 1329, 1349-50 (1996).
123 Notice also that the common law system, wielded as it is by the plaintiffs' bar, can exert
the most deterrence on conduct that is least in need of it. Companies already have a compelling
incentive to avoid massive disasters such as the Exxon Valdez oil spill, quite apart from any
legal ramifications. To be sure, the common law is hardly unique in this respect.
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is probably even worse than leaving the issues in the politicized hands
of legislatures and regulatory agencies. Millions of small tort and
contract decisions will not magically coalesce into coherent public
policy. ,124
CONCLUSION
I'm going to equivocate here: On one hand, courts are good at
addressing "focused, high-probability, bilateral hazards that have
ripened (or are about to ripen) into concrete injuries."'125 As to such
disputes, the common law can be a useful regulatory tool, both to
create ex ante incentives for potential defendants and to provide ex
post compensation to injured plaintiffs. On the other hand, we don't
really know very much about how much environmental protection the
common law independently could provide, and we have reason to be
skeptical that the right sorts of cases will percolate into the judicial
system for resolution. For that reason, courts probably aren't the best
regulatory tool to address "diffuse, low-probability, multi-lateral, and
temporally-remote harms,"'126 such as global warming. Whether these
potential deficiencies of the common law could be counterbalanced
by administrative regulation (or whether they would be outweighed
by the many deficiencies of regulation) is a subject for another
essay.
127
124 Peter Huber, Panel 11: Public Versus Private Environmental Regulation, 21 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 445,454 (1994).
125 Huber, Safety and the Second Best, supra note 121, at 331.
126 Id
127 Cf NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW,
ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY (paperback ed. 1996).
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